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authorities and the Russian Federation seem to have argued. The article explains
that beyond the context of decolonization, the right to self-determination does not
encompass a general right to unilateral secession and demonstrates that contem-
porary international law does not acknowledge a right to remedial secession. With
respect to the case of Crimea, it argues that even when assuming that such a right
does exist, the threshold in this regard is not met. In the absence of a legal enti-
tlement, the article subsequently turns to the question whether Crimea’s unilateral
secession was prohibited under international law. It contends that while the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity discourages unilateral secession, it does not actually
prohibit it. Nonetheless, there are situations in which an attempt at unilateral
secession is considered to be illegal in view of the circumstances. It is argued that it
is precisely this exception that is relevant in the case of Crimea.
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1 Introduction
On 17 March 2014, following a highly contested referendum, Ukraine’s
Autonomous Republic of Crimea declared its independence and filed an application
to ‘reunite’ with the Russian Federation.1 Crimea’s request was welcomed by
Russia and, on the following day, President Putin and the representatives of Crimea
signed an accession agreement that formally designated the Republic of Crimea as a
federal subject of the Russian Federation.2 The crisis on the Crimean Peninsula has
raised various pertinent questions of international law. This is also reflected in the
arguments adduced by the Crimean and Russian authorities, which both made
reference to international law in their attempts to justify the events. Crimea’s
declaration of independence made a reference to, inter alia, the Charter of the
United Nations and the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion on
Kosovo’s independence, arguing that the Court had ruled that unilateral declarations
of independence do not violate international law.3 Likewise, the Russian Federation
claimed that the referendum held was in compliance with international norms. In his
address of 18 March, President Putin recalled ‘the well-known Kosovo precedent’
and referred to the right to self-determination in order to justify Crimea’s secession
from Ukraine. He argued:
As it declared independence and decided to hold a referendum, the Supreme
Council of Crimea referred to the United Nations Charter, which speaks of the
right of nations to self-determination. Incidentally, I would like to remind you
that when Ukraine seceded from the USSR it did exactly the same thing,
almost word for word. Ukraine used this right, yet the residents of Crimea are
denied it. Why is that?4
It is notable that the Russian Federation contended that the people of Crimea had
exercised their right to self-determination on various occasions. During the debates
in the UN Security Council, the Russian representative presented a similar view,
claiming that:
[i]n strict compliance with international law and democratic procedure,
without outside interference and through a free referendum, the people of
Crimea have fulfilled what is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations
and a great number of fundamental international legal documents—their right
to self-determination.5
1 See ‘Crimea declares independence, seeks UN recognition’, 17 March 2014, http://rt.com/news/crimea-
referendum-results-official-250/. Accessed August 2015.
2 See ‘Agreement on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation signed’, 18
March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6890. Accessed August 2015.
3 See ‘Crimea parliament declares independence from Ukraine ahead of referendum’, 11 March 2014,
http://rt.com/news/crimea-parliament-independence-ukraine-086/. Accessed August 2015.
4 See ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’, 18 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/
6889. Accessed August 2015.
5 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.7144, 19 March 2014, p. 8.
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Likewise, the Russian Federation submitted in the General Assembly that during
the referendum, ‘an overwhelming majority of the Crimean population voted in
favor of being with Russia, as a consequence of which it ‘could not refuse the
Crimeans’ wish to support their right to self-determination in fulfilling their long-
standing aspirations’.6 The Russian Federation thus seems to hold the view that the
right to self-determination equals or at least includes a right to independence, i.e.
unilateral secession. More specifically, it may even be said that the Russian
Federation (implicitly) relied on the doctrine of remedial secession, which is seen to
encompass a right to unilateral secession in case of serious injustices suffered by a
people. President Putin advanced remedial arguments in his speech of 18 March,
contending that
those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression.
Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. In
view of this, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help
in defending their rights and lives […]. [N]aturally, we could not leave this
plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress.7
To the same effect, the Russian Federation claimed in the Security Council that
there had been ‘threats of violence by ultranationalists against the security, lives and
legitimate interests of Russians and all Russian-speaking peoples’ in Crimea and
Eastern Ukraine and that ‘the issue is one of defending our citizens and compatriots,
as well as the most import[ant] human right—the right to life’.8
The accuracy of these views presented, however, is highly questionable under
contemporary international law. This article therefore aims to assess Crimea’s
separation from Ukraine against the backdrop of the international legal framework
concerning the right to self-determination and secession. To this end, this article
will first briefly introduce the background of the events that led to the issuing of
Crimea’s unilateral declaration of independence. It will then turn to what Crimea
sought to achieve with its declaration, i.e. secession from Ukraine. The question of
whether or not Crimea had a right to unilaterally secede from Ukraine will be
considered. In this respect, it will be argued that beyond the context of
decolonization, the right to self-determination does not encompass a general right
to unilateral secession. Moreover, particular attention will be paid to the contested
theory of remedial secession—an issue that has not received thorough discussion in
scholarly debates on the events in Crimea so far.9 It will be explained that positive
international law does not encompass a right to remedial secession. In the absence
of a legal entitlement, the question then arises whether Crimea’s unilateral secession
was actually prohibited under international law. Seeking to answer this question, it
will be contended that while the principle of territorial integrity discourages
6 UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/68/PV.80, 27 March 2014, p. 3.
7 See ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’, 18 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/
6889. Accessed August 2015.
8 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.7125, 3 March 2015, p. 3 (Mr. Churkin).
9 Exceptions in this respect may be Christakis (2015), Vidmar (2015) and Walter (2014), who briefly
touched upon the matter.
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unilateral secession, it does not prohibit it. Nonetheless, there are situations in which
an attempt at unilateral secession is considered to be illegal in view of the
circumstances. It will be argued that it is precisely this exception that is relevant in
the case of Crimea.
2 The Crisis in Crimea
In order to understand Crimea’s separation from Ukraine, it is necessary to briefly
sketch the background of the events in. As President Putin has argued on several
occasions, Crimea has historically been linked to Russia.10 Indeed, the Crimean
Peninsula was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1783 and was part of Russia until
1954, when the then General Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev,
awarded Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a token of friendship.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, Crimea became part of a
newly independent Ukraine and converted into a constituent entity of that State. The
peninsula was formally granted the status of an Autonomous Republic within
Ukraine with the adoption of the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution.11 The uneasy
relationship between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was consequently put to
an end with the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, in which
both States pledged to ‘respect each other’s territorial integrity, and confirm[ed] the
inviolability of borders existing between them’.12
The Ukrainian Revolution of 2014, which was initiated by the Euromaidan
movement in the capital of Kiev, had significant effects in Crimea as well. With an
ethnic Russian majority inhabiting the peninsula,13 the Crimean authorities had
always strongly supported the pro-Russian policies of the then President, Viktor
Yanukovych. The ousting of his regime and replacement by a pro-European interim
government, followed by the approval of a Draft Bill that would revoke the 2012
State Language Policy Bill, thereby banning Russian as an official language within
Ukraine,14 sparked secessionist demands in Crimea. In late February 2014, armed
10 See e.g., ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’, 18 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/
news/6889 (claiming that ‘In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of
Russia’). Accessed August 2015.
11 See Chapters IX and X of the Ukrainian Constitution.
12 Art. 2 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation of Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a341002.pdf (Annex, unofficial translation). Accessed August
2015.
13 Crimea has a population of more than 2 million people of which approximately 58 % are ethnically
Russian, 24 % are Ukrainian, and 12 % are Crimean Tatar. See ‘State Statistics Committee of Ukraine,
All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001’, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/.
Accessed August 2015.
14 The 2012 State Language Policy Bill was signed by President Yanukovych and gave minority
languages—including Russian—the status of an official language when a minority group making up 10 %
of the residents of a particular region would have this language as their native language. The Draft Bill
defined the Ukrainian language as the sole official State language at all levels in Ukraine. See Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine, ‘On Principles of the State Language Policy’, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/anot/en/
5029-17. Accessed August 2015.
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men without insignia—labelled as ‘little green men’ who were later admitted to be
Russian troops15—were reported to have invaded the major Crimean airports and
military bases. They also seized key buildings in the peninsula’s capital Simferopol,
including the Crimean Supreme Council, and installed a new, pro-Russian Prime
Minister.16 On 1 March 2014, the above-mentioned Draft Bill was vetoed by the
interim President of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, but to no avail. After the
Russian Parliament approved President Putin’s appeal to deploy military troops in
Ukraine that same day,17 Russian forces rapidly took control over Crimea.18
Only a fortnight after Russian troops were deployed on Ukrainian territory, on 11
March 2014, 78 out of 100 Members of the Crimean Supreme Council voted for a
declaration of independence. The preamble to the declaration reads as follows:
We, the members of the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and the Sevastopol City Council, with regard to the Charter of the United
Nations and a whole range of other international documents and taking into
consideration the confirmation of the status of Kosovo by the United Nations
International Court of Justice on July 22, 2010, which says that [a] unilateral
declaration of independence by a part of the country does not violate any
international norms, make this decision jointly.19
The adoption of this declaration paved the way for the referendum on Crimea’s
status that was scheduled for 16 March 2014. If the outcome of the referendum
would be in favour of Crimea’s reunification with the Russian Federation, the
Crimean authorities would declare Crimea to be an independent State and
subsequently submit a request to join Russia. According to the official figures, an
overwhelming majority of 95.5 % of all votes cast, with a turnout of approximately
83 % of Crimea’s registered voters, indeed expressed support for Crimea to become
part of the Russian Federation.20 Consequently, on 17 March 2014, the Crimean
parliament declared the Republic of Crimea to be an independent State and
requested the Russian Federation ‘to admit the Republic of Crimea as a new subject
with the status of a republic’.21 President Putin subsequently signed an executive
15 President Putin himself acknowledged that the so-called ‘little green men’ in Crimea had been Russian
troops, whose presence was to ensure that the people of Crimea could express their opinion during the
referendum of 16 March 2014. See ‘Putin Acknowledges Russian Military Servicemen Were in Crimea’,
17 April 2014, http://rt.com/news/crimea-defense-russian-soldiers-108. Accessed August 2015.
16 See ‘Gunmen Seize Parliament in Ukraine’s Crimea’, Raise Russian Flag, 27 February 2014, http://
edition.cnn.com/2014/02/27/world/europe/ukraine-politics/. Accessed August 2015; Reuters, 12 March
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/12/us-ukraine-crisis-osce-idUSBREA2B1C120140312.
Accessed August 2015.
17 See ‘Vladimir Putin submitted appeal to the Federation Council’, 1 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/
news/6751. Accessed August 2015.
18 For a timeline concerning the events, see ‘Ukraine Crisis Timeline’, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-26248275. Accessed August 2015.
19 ‘Crimea parliament declares independence from Ukraine ahead of referendum’, 11 March 2014, http://
rt.com/news/crimea-parliament-independence-ukraine-086/, accessed August 2015.
20 Ibid.
21 ‘US EU set sanctions as Putin recognises Crimea ‘‘sovereignty’’’, 17 March 2014, http://uk.reuters.
com/article/2014/03/17/uk-ukraine-idUKBREA1H0EM20140317. Accessed 30 July 2014.
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order recognizing the Republic of Crimea as an independent State.22 The next day,
on 18 March 2014, an accession agreement formally declaring Crimea to be a
federal subject of the Russian Federation was signed by President Putin and the
representatives of Crimea.23 With this accession agreement, which was ratified by a
federal law on 21 March 2014,24 Crimea had officially become part of the Russian
Federation.
3 In Search of a Right to Unilateral Secession for Crimea
Groups or entities wishing to secede from the State to which they formally belong
often invoke a right to secede stemming from the right to self-determination of
peoples. While the Crimean authorities themselves did not explicitly do so in the
declaration of independence, it was seen above that the Russian Federation on
various occasions referred to the right to self-determination in order to justify
Crimea’s secession from Ukraine. In view of these claims, this section aims to shed
light on the question of whether Crimea has a right to unilateral secession under
contemporary international law.
As a preliminary remark, it first deserves to be noted that the question of a right to
unilateral secession under international law only becomes relevant when the parent
State opposes the breaking away of part of its territory. For instance, prior to the
referendum on Scottish independence that was held on 18 September 2014, the United
Kingdom’s government in Westminster had indicated that it would respect the
outcome: ‘[i]f a majority of those who vote want Scotland to be independent then
Scotland would become an independent country after a process of negotiations’.25
Hence, should Scotland have voted for independence during the referendum of 18
September 2014,26 it would have qualified as an example of consensual secession,
since the UK government had approved the referendum and committed itself to accept
its outcome, also in case of a vote for independence.27 In such circumstances, domestic
22 ‘Executive Order on recognising Republic of Crimea’, 17 March 2014, available at http://eng.kremlin.
ru/news/6884, accessed August 2015.
23 ‘Agreement on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation signed’, 18 March
2014, available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6890, accessed August 2015.
24 ‘Laws on admitting Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation’, 21 March 2014, available at
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6912, accessed August 2015.
25 See ‘Scottish Independence Referendum’, https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/scottish-
independence-referendum/about#what-happens-if-there-is-a-yes-vote. Accessed August 2015. Following
the so-called Edinburgh Agreement, which was signed by Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond and the
UK Prime Minister David Cameron and gave Scotland the powers to hold a referendum, the Scottish
Parliament approved the terms of the plebiscite in the Scottish Independence Referendum Bill, SP Bill
25B, 27 June 2013, http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_Bills/Scottish%20Independence%
20Referendum%20Bill/b25bs4-aspassed.pdf. Accessed August 2015.
26 On 18 September, 55.3 % of the Scottish population voted against independence. See ‘Scotland
independence referendum—Results’, http://www.bbc.com/news/events/scotland-decides/results. Acces-
sed August 2015.
27 On the international legal consequences of Scotland’s (hypothetical) secession, see Crawford and
Boyle (2012).
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law and procedures govern the secession.28 The same may apply to those cases in
which the domestic constitution of the parent State includes a provision determining
that specific constituent entities have a right to secede.29 The 1994 Ethiopian
Constitution is one of the few contemporary examples of constitutions explicitly
providing for secession, as it stipulates that ‘[e]very Nation, Nationality and People in
Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to
secession’.30 It should be noted, however, that such general constitutional provisions
are rarely effective in practice when they do not encompass a clear procedure or
mechanism for secession as well.31 Only in exceptional cases has a constitutional
arrangement actually led to the emergence of an independent State. Examples in that
respect are the secession of Montenegro from the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro, and the secession of South Sudan from Sudan. In both cases this involved
a situation in which the constitution providing for a right to secession was drafted in the
context of peace negotiations and provided for a mechanism to effectuate this right.32
This section will first explain that international law does not include a right to
external self-determination or unilateral secession beyond the context of decolo-
nization. In this context, special attention will be paid to the concept of remedial
secession and its position in international law, as this doctrine seems to have been
relied upon implicitly by the Russian Federation. Subsequently, the lawfulness of
Crimea’s secession from Ukraine will be evaluated against the backdrop of the
above-mentioned legal framework.
3.1 The Right to Self-Determination in the Context of Decolonization
and Beyond
As was observed above, the Russian Federation claimed that the people of Crimea have
lawfully exercised their right to self-determination by seceding from Ukraine and
seeking unification with Russia. In the context of decolonization, the right to self-
determination indeed encompassed a right to independence. The UN Charter introduced
the notion of self-determination as one of the principal purposes of the United Nations.33
While both Articles 1(2) and 55 explicitly refer to self-determination and its inclusion in
28 This is not to say that the secession is necessarily in accordance with international law. As will be
explained in Sect. 4 infra, an attempt to secede is illegal when connected with egregious violations of
norms of general international law, in particular those of a jus cogens character. See ICJ, Accordance with
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports
2010, p. 403, para. 81.
29 Weller (2005) pp. 16, 19. For a more elaborate discussion of constitutional secession, see Radan
(2011), pp. 333–343.
30 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, adopted on 8 December 1994, Art. 39(4),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5a84.html. Accessed August 2015.
31 Examples in this respect are the Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY). While the constitutions of the Soviet Union and the SFRY included a right to secession, in the
absence of a clear mechanism for effectuating this process, the successor States did not emerge on this
constitutional basis. See Vidmar (2012b), pp. 710–711.
32 For a more elaborate discussion of these examples, see ibid., pp. 711–715.
33 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
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the UN Charter was an important step in the development of the notion, its precise legal
status and content remained unclear. Light was shed on this in the context of
decolonization, when self-determination became a legal entitlement for colonial
peoples. The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples proclaimed ‘the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations’34 and declared that ‘[a]ll peoples have
the right to self-determination’.35 It became clear that this right could be exercised both
externally—through independence from the metropolitan State—and internally, as long
as it was based on the freely expressed will of the people concerned. As the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning 1960 Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (hereafter:
Friendly Relations Declaration) indicates, the modalities of exercising the right to self-
determination could involve ‘the establishment of a sovereign and independent State,
the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any
other political status freely determined by a people’.36 In the context of decolonization,
however, the right to self-determination was an entitlement for colonized entities only:
the inhabitants of trust territories and non-self-governing territories.37 At present, trust
territories now no longer exist,38 and there are only seventeen non-self-governing
territories left that are still to be decolonized on the basis of the right to self-
determination.39
The view that the right to external self-determination extends beyond the context
of decolonization, however, is by no means self-evident. States have been reluctant
to recognize such legal entitlement for other than peoples under colonial
domination, alien subjugation and foreign occupation for various reasons.40 In this
respect, the principle of territorial integrity plays an important part. Enshrined in
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the Friendly Relations Declaration and various other
international instruments, this fundamental legal principle is seen to safeguard ‘the
territorial framework of independent States’.41 States and commentators alike have
34 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), UN Doc. A/RES/1514(XV), 14 December 1960, Preamble.
35 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), UN Doc. A/RES/1514(XV), 14 December 1960, para. 2.
36 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625
(XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), Annex, 24 October 1970, Principle V, para. 4.
37 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (XV), UN Doc. A/RES/1514(XV), 14 December 1960, para. 5.
38 For a definition of trust territories, see Art. 77 UN Charter.
39 For guidelines on what constitutes a non-self-governing territory, see Principles which Should Guide
Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for
under Article 73(e) of the Charter, General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), UN Doc. A/RES/1541(XV),
15 December 1960, Principle IV. For a list of today’s non-self-governing territories, see http://www.un.
org/en/decolonization/nonselfgovterritories.shtml. Accessed August 2015.
40 See Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution
2625 (XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), Annex, 24 October 1970, Principle V, para. 2.
41 Blay (2013), para. 1.
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often contended that beyond the decolonization process,42 unilateral secession is
incompatible with the territorial integrity of States. In fact, it is frequently argued
that the principle of territorial integrity prohibits attempts at unilateral secession.
While it will be explained in Sect. 4.1 that this argument is not fully adequate, it
does reflect the importance attached to the principle and the interests of States in
protecting their territory against unwished-for alterations of borders. In addition to
these disruptive effects on the national level, States generally fear that acknowl-
edging a right to unilateral secession would affect international stability and even
open a Pandora’s box.43
In view of the above, unsurprisingly, no convention encompasses a general right
to independence or unilateral secession for peoples, minorities, or other groups.
Common Article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) stipulates that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development’.44 As such, it seems to grant a
universally applicable right to self-determination that is not limited to the colonial
context and does not outlaw the option of unilateral secession. However, the
preparatory works of the Human Rights Covenants demonstrate that the provision
was not intended to grant a right to unilateral secession to non-colonial
communities.45 In addition to the Human Rights Covenants, various soft law
instruments include a reference to self-determination beyond the context of
decolonization as well.46 Examples are found in the Friendly Relations Declara-
tion,47 the Helsinki Final Act,48 the Charter of Paris,49 and the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action.50 It is important to note, however, that these references
42 It is important to note that the principle of territorial integrity was not seen to apply to the overseas
territory of a metropolitan State.
43 See e.g., Cassese (1995), p. 1.
44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 3.
45 For the drafting history of Art. 1(1) ICCPR, see Bossuyt (1987), pp. 32–37.
46 While not legally binding per se, soft law instruments may well have an important role to play in
international law. First, it should be noted that the Friendly Relations Declaration is seen to be reflective
of customary international law (see Sect. 3.2 infra). Moreover, as Dinah Shelton argued, soft law
instruments may also ‘fill in gaps in international legal instruments’ and ‘form part of the […] State
practice that can be utilized to interpret treaties’. It is particularly this interpretative function that renders
the instruments referred to important for the present purposes. See Shelton (2010), pp. 166–167.
47 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625
(XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), Annex, 24 October 1970, Principle V, para. 7. See Sect. 3.2 infra
for a discussion of the safeguard clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration.
48 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe Final Act, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, 14 ILM 1292 (1975), Principle VII.
49 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21
November 1990, 30 ILM 193 (1991), para. 7.
50 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc.
A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, Part I, para. 2.
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generally contain a so-called ‘safeguard clause’ emphasizing that the exercise of the
right to self-determination should be limited to prevent threats to the territorial
integrity of States.51 The safeguard clauses contained in these instruments thus
appear to preclude interpreting the right to self-determination as encompassing a
legal entitlement to unilateral secession. In practice, States have generally not
accepted attempts at unilateral secession either. To the same effect, no entity that
has emerged through unilateral secession has been admitted to the United Nations as
long as the parent State was opposed to this.52
Accordingly, in the post-decolonization era, an internal, intra-State dimension of
the right to self-determination has been emphasized that focuses on its implemen-
tation within the framework of the existing State. As such, self-determination should
be realized in the relationship between peoples and their government, and involves a
continuous entitlement that does not cease to exist as soon as an independent State
has been created. This focus on internal self-determination was also confirmed by
the Reference re Secession of Quebec, in which the Supreme Court of Canada was
confronted with the hypothetical question whether Quebec would have a right to
secede unilaterally from Canada under, inter alia, international law. The Supreme
Court stressed that ‘[t]he recognized sources of international law establish that the
right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-
determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural
development within the framework of an existing state’.53 This basically requires
the presence of a government representing the people inhabiting the territory
without any distinction and popular participation in the political decision-making
process of the State.54 Various arrangements may be implemented in order to
facilitate effective participation and true representation of the whole people to the
territory. Federalism and autonomy arrangements, either concerning certain
substantive issues or with respect to a defined territory, are relevant instruments
in this respect, as they offer enhanced self-government for groups within the State.55
Preserving the territorial status quo of the parent State, such arrangements are often
presented as (preferable) alternatives to secession.
A prominent question concerns who actually constitutes a ‘people’ as a holder of
the right to self-determination beyond the context of decolonization. As was already
explained, in the decolonization era peoples entitled to self-determination were the
inhabitants of trust and non-self-governing territories, i.e. the population of
territories that had not yet attained full independence. Beyond this decolonization
process, the right to self-determination as described above is first and foremost a
right of the inhabitants of an existing State as a whole. As Judge Yusuf noted in his
Separate Opinion attached to the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, it is ‘particularly […] a
right of the entire population of the State to determine its own political, economic
51 See Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, para. 127.
52 See Crawford (2006), p. 390 and pp. 391–402.
53 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, para. 126.
54 See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe Final Act, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, 14 ILM 1292 (1975), Principle VII.
55 On various arrangements in this respect, see e.g. Weller (2009a).
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and social destiny and to choose a representative government’.56 In addition to this,
it is accepted that certain parts of that population can also be regarded as holders of
the right to (internal) self-determination. This was also endorsed by the Canadian
Supreme Court, which noted that ‘[i]t is clear that a people may include only a
portion of the population of an existing State’.57 While international law does not
offer a definition of what constitutes a ‘people’ commonly agreed upon, several
characteristics are generally regarded as guiding in this respect. First, the members
of the group share objectively identifiable common features that distinguish them
from other groups. This may involve some or all of the following features: ‘(a) a
common historical tradition; (b) racial or ethnic identity; (c) cultural homogeneity;
(d) linguistic unity; (e) religious or ideological affinity; (f) territorial connection;
(g) common economic life’.58 The relationship of the group with a particular
territory is often considered to be an essential precondition, as was also observed in
the influential study prepared by Aureliu Cristescu.59 In addition to these objective
features, a subjective element is frequently mentioned. This subjective element
refers to ‘the belief of being a distinct people distinguishable from other people
inhabiting the globe, and the wish to be recognized as such, as well as the wish to
maintain, strengthen and develop the group’s identity’.60 As this concerns the
internal perception of the group itself, it may be difficult for outside observers to
determine whether the subjective requirement is fulfilled. Notwithstanding this
difficulty, it is important to note that (ethnic, religious, or linguistic) minorities
should not be confused with ‘peoples’. Minorities have been defined as groups
numerically smaller to the rest of the population of the State, in a non-
dominant position, whose members, being nationals of the State, possess
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of
the population and so, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards
preserving their cultures, traditions, religion or language.61
Thus, similar to peoples, minorities are generally characterized by a combination
of objective and subjective elements. In most cases, however, they lack the
56 See ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion
of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Separate Opinion Judge Yusuf, para. 9.
57 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, paras. 123–124.
58 UNESCO, International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples.
Final Report and Recommendations, Paris, 22 February 1990, SHS-89/CONF.602/7, para. 22 (1).
59 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development on the
Basis of United Nations Instruments. Study Prepared by A. Cristescu, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1
(1981), para. 279 (noting that the existence of a people ‘implies a relationship with a territory, even if the
people in question has been wrongfully expelled from it and artificially replaced by another population’).
60 Raicˇ (2002), pp. 262–263. See also UNESCO, International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of
the Concept of the Rights of Peoples. Final Report and Recommendations, Paris, 22 February 1990, SHS-
89/CONF.602/7, para. 22 (3–4).
61 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities. Study Prepared by F. Capotorti, UN Doc. E/Cn.4/Sub.2/384/Add.1–7 (1991), para. 568.
Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine 339
123
connection with a particular territory, as a result of which most minority groups do
not constitute subgroups in the sense of peoples entitled to self-determination.
Instead, persons belonging to minorities enjoy, inter alia, the rights protected in
Article 27 of the ICCPR, which grants them—on an individual basis62—the right ‘to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their
own language’.
3.2 A Right to Remedial Secession?
While it was explained that no general right to unilateral secession exists under
contemporary international law, over the last decades, it is increasingly often argued
in literature that, in exceptional circumstances, a qualified right to unilateral
secession may arise in case of serious injustices suffered by a people. Such an
alleged right to remedial secession is generally construed on the basis of the General
Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (hereafter: Friendly Relations Declaration),63 which is considered to
be reflective of customary international law.64 After having endorsed that all
peoples have a right to self-determination, Principle V, paragraph 7 of the
Declaration stipulates:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs [concerning the right to self-determina-
tion] shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compli-
ance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
colour.65
This so-called ‘safeguard clause’ was reiterated in the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, albeit phrased somewhat differently.66 Both clauses indicate
62 The rights of minorities are ‘in-community-with-others-rights’: individual human rights that can be
exercised in community with other members of the group.
63 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625
(XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), Annex, 24 October 1970.
64 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion
of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, para. 80 (referring to ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986,
ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, paras. 191–193). This is not to say, however, that the a contrario interpretation
of the safeguard clause, as explained below, also reflects customary international law.
65 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625
(XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), Annex, 24 October 1970, Principle V, para. 7.
66 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc.
A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, Part I, para. 2.
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that beyond the context of decolonization, the exercise of the right to self-
determination of peoples should not disturb the territorial integrity of States. Yet,
proponents of a right to remedial secession have interpreted the clauses as indicating
the conditional character of the principle of territorial integrity. In this regard, they
have advanced an a contrario reading implying that States not respecting the right
to internal self-determination of their population would forfeit the protection of their
territorial integrity. This would then clear the way for unilateral secession as a
remedy for serious injustices, or so it is argued.67 Such a position was taken by, inter
alia, Lee C. Buchheit and Antonio Cassese.68 Subsequent to the writings of these
scholars, a significant amount of scholarly literature has argued in favour of a right
to remedial secession and touched upon circumstances under which such a right
would arise.69 As such, the frustration of meaningful internal self-determination, the
existence of flagrant violations of fundamental human rights, and structural
discriminatory treatment of a people have often been mentioned as parameters for
the exercise of a right to remedial secession. Moreover, proponents of a right to
remedial secession commonly regard it as an ultimum remedium, a last resort
remedy for such injustices. The exhaustion of peaceful remedies is therefore
considered to be an additional prerequisite as well.70 Despite the relative consensus
on these parameters, authors supporting the existence of a right to remedial
secession are divided on the question of the subjects of such legal entitlement.
While a right to remedial secession is generally considered to be a right of ‘peoples’,
the detailed interpretation of this notion has remained problematic. In particular,
scholarship seems divided on the question of which sub-State groups—numerical,
linguistic, religious, ethnic minorities or otherwise—could be seen as the
beneficiaries of such a right.71
It should be emphasized, however, that scholarship is by no means conclusive on
the existence of a right to remedial secession in international law, as numerous
authors have rejected this thesis. Some have done so for rather practical reasons,
such as Alexandra Xanthaki, who raised the question of who would be able to
determine whether a certain people would have a right to remedial secession in view
of the circumstances.72 While this is a relevant question indeed, more fundamental
and decisive objections deserve to be singled out. First, it should be noted that it is
highly problematic to base such a sweeping entitlement on the basis of an inverted
reading of the safeguard clauses. As Malcolm Shaw argued,
[s]uch a major change in legal principle cannot be introduced by way of an
ambiguous subordinate clause, especially when the principle of territorial
67 Van den Driest (2013), pp. 106–107.
68 Buchheit (1978), pp. 221–222; Cassese (1995), p. 118.
69 See e.g., Dugard and Raicˇ (2006), pp. 103–104; Franck (1993), pp. 13–14; Kooijmans (1996), p. 215;
Murswiek (1993), pp. 26–27; Raicˇ (2002), pp. 324–328; Ryngaert and Griffioen (2009), para. 14;
Tomuschat (1993), pp. 9–11. For more references, see Van den Driest (2013), p. 109 (fn. 48).
70 Van den Driest (2013), p. 113.
71 For two opposing views, see e.g., Cassese (1995) pp. 112–121 and Raicˇ (2002) pp. 251–258. See also
Van den Driest (2013), pp. 115–117.
72 Xanthaki (2007), p. 144.
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integrity has always been accepted and proclaimed as a core principle of
international law, and is indeed placed before the qualifying clause in the
provision in question.73
As such, the theoretical foundations of a right to remedial secession are rather
fragile. In addition, the thesis of remedial secession should be rejected in view of the
lack of compelling evidence for the practical existence of such a right.74 Although
the doctrine of remedial secession may certainly be appealing from a moral
perspective75 and can be appreciated against the backdrop of the process that is
often referred to as the humanization of the international legal order,76 it will be
demonstrated below that it only has a very weak basis in practice.77
3.2.1 Support for Remedial Secession in the Decisions and Opinions of (Semi-)
Judicial Bodies
Some judicial and semi-judicial bodies have made reference to the theory in cases
brought before them. An early—if not the very first—reference to the idea of what
would later be labelled as remedial secession can be found in the report of the
Committee of Rapporteurs, who were appointed by the League of Nations to render
an opinion in the A˚land Islands case in 1921. The case involved a legal dispute
between Sweden and Finland and concerned the question whether the inhabitants of
the A˚land Islands—an archipelago in the Baltic Sea—were allowed to secede from
Finland and integrate with Sweden, in view of the cultural and linguistic ties with
the latter. Attaching great importance to stability within States, the Committee of
Rapporteurs rejected the existence of an absolute right to unilateral secession. At the
same time, however, it seemed to leave open the possibility of secession as a last
resort: ‘[t]he separation of a minority from the State can only be considered as an
altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or
the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees’.78 According to the
Committee of Rapporteurs, however, this did not apply to the A˚landers, since no
evidence of oppression could be found. Therefore, the Committee of Rapporteurs
deemed it possible to reach a settlement short of secession that would guarantee the
cultural identity of the A˚landers, for instance through an autonomy arrangement.79
73 Shaw (1997), p. 483.
74 This has also been argued by, inter alia, Hilpold (2009), p. 47; Tancredi (2006), pp. 184–186; Vidmar
(2015), p. 370. For more references, see Van den Driest (2013), pp. 118–121.
75 For a moral perspective, see e.g., Buchanan (2004), pp. 353–373.
76 This refers to the development of international law from a primarily State-centred system towards a
human-centred system, in which States are no longer the sole actors and which is increasingly concerned
with respecting and promoting the interests of human beings. On this development, see e.g., Canc¸ado
Trindade (2010); Meron (2009). See also Van den Driest (2013), pp. 314–319.
77 On this question in general, see Van den Driest (2013).
78 Report of the Committee of Rapporteurs (Beyens, Calonder, Elkens), 16 April 1921, LN Council Doc.
B7/2I/68/106 [VII], paras. 27–28.
79 Ibid., para. 128.
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The most often cited contemporary judicial reference to remedial secession
concerns the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in the Reference re Secession of
Quebec. When asked whether Quebec would have a right to secede unilaterally
from Canada under international law, the Supreme Court noted that only in
exceptional circumstances might the right to self-determination be exercised
externally through secession. Yet, the Supreme Court acknowledged that this
would only apply to ‘the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully
defined circumstances’. It observed that several scholars had argued that ‘when a
people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination
internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession’.80 Notably, the
Supreme Court immediately mitigated its proposition by adding the—often
ignored—caveat that it remained ‘unclear whether this […] actually reflects an
established international law standard’.81 The Supreme Court did not find it
necessary to elaborate on this matter though, since it deemed that the exceptional
circumstances referred to were ‘manifestly inapplicable’ to the case of Quebec.82
As such, the acknowledgement of a right to remedial secession remained confined
to an obiter dictum.
The most recent example of a case in which the right to remedial secession was
touched upon concerns the Kosovo Advisory Opinion.83 In this case, the ICJ was
asked by the UN General Assembly whether the unilateral declaration of
independence of 17 February 2008, issued by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government in Kosovo, was in accordance with international law.84 The Court
interpreted the question before it restrictively, avoiding pronouncing itself on the
legal consequences of the declaration or the question whether or not Kosovo had
achieved statehood. It likewise left aside the contemporary meaning of the right to
self-determination and the acceptance of remedial secession under international
law.85 On these matters, the Court observed that States taking part in the advisory
proceedings had demonstrated ‘radically different views’ on the scope of the right to
self-determination beyond the context of decolonization and, notably, that
[s]imilar differences exited regarding whether international law provides for a
right of ‘remedial secession’ and, if so, in what circumstances. There was also
a sharp difference of views as to whether the circumstances which some
80 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, para. 134.
81 Ibid., para. 135.
82 Ibid., para. 138.
83 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion
of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403.
84 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/3 (Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice on Whether the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is in Accordance with
International Law), UN Doc. A/RES/63/3, 8 October 2008. The resolution was adopted by a recorded
vote of 77 in favour with 6 against and 74 abstaining.
85 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion
of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, para. 51.
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participants maintained would give rise to a right of ‘remedial secession’ were
actually present in Kosovo.86
Subsequently, the Court observed that arguments in favour of a right to remedial
secession were virtually always made as a secondary argument only.87 The Court
did not consider it necessary to ‘resolve such questions in the present case’ as it
deemed those issues to be ‘beyond the scope of the question’ which was before it.88
Commentators and judges alike have criticized the Court’s narrow approach.89 Yet,
the Court’s restraint is generally in line with the pronouncements of other judicial
and semi-judicial bodies that, as was also highlighted above, have mostly used very
cautious language when considering the existence of a right to remedial secession.90
This conveys the impression that they sought to avoid attaching far-reaching
consequences to their decisions. In addition, it should be emphasized that the
pronouncements on the matter remained limited to an obiter dictum and that in no
case has a right to secede unilaterally been granted as a remedy to the injustices
which occurred in the case at hand. As such, the evidence for the existence of a right
to remedial secession as provided in case law is only very weak.
3.2.2 Remedial Secession as a Norm of Customary International Law?
This brings us to the question whether an entitlement to remedial secession may
have emerged as a norm of customary international law.91 For a customary norm to
crystallize, the presence of representative and virtually uniform State practice and
opinio juris is required.92 It is therefore important to consider whether international
practice evidences these two elements of customary international law on the matter
of remedial secession. The case of Bangladesh has repeatedly been suggested as
evidencing the existence of a right to remedial secession. As was argued by John
Dugard and David Raicˇ, for instance, the case of Bangladesh is widely
acknowledged as an example of a lawful and successful secession following severe
86 Ibid., para. 82.
87 Ibid., para. 82.
88 Ibid., para. 83.
89 See e.g., Arp (2010); Burri (2010); Christakis (2011); Hannum (2011); Ryngaert (2010); Schrijver
(2010). See also ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Separate Opinion Judge Yusuf, paras. 5–6; ibid., Declaration Judge
Simma, para. 7.
90 See also African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire,
Comm. No. 75/92, 1995 (not dated), paras. 4–6; European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey,
Application No. 15318/89, Judgment (Merits), 18 December 1996, Concurring opinion of Judge
Wildhaber joined by Judge Ryssdal, paras. 1–2; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
Kevin Nwanga Gumne et al. v. Cameroon, Comm. No. 266/2003, 2009 (not dated), paras. 194–200. For
an elaborate analysis of all relevant cases, see Van den Driest (2013), pp. 121–155.
91 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)(b).
92 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 77; ICJ, Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ
Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 207.
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oppression and gross human rights violations.93 In addition to Bangladesh, the more
recent case of Kosovo has often been referred to as the test case of a right to
remedial secession.94 While these cases may indeed be relevant to the doctrine of
remedial secession in view of the backdrop against which the secessions took place,
it will be demonstrated below that they do not present clear and compelling State
practice in that respect.95
3.2.2.1 The Case of Bangladesh Bangladesh, formerly known as East Pakistan,
unilaterally declared independence from Pakistan in 1971.96 The East had faced
severe domination and discrimination by the central authorities in Islamabad. When
the elections for the National Assembly of Pakistan held in December 1970 led to an
overwhelming victory of the Bengali Awami League, which aimed at gaining
autonomy for the East, the central government in Islamabad suspended the National
Assembly’s inaugural session in March 1971 and crushed the resistance with large-
scale military actions. According to some, this even culminated in genocide.97 On
10 April 1971, while still being involved in an armed conflict with the military
forces of the central government, the Awami League proclaimed the independence
of East Pakistan. As the violence against and the brutal oppression of the Bengalis
continued, India eventually intervened in early December 1971 to fight the Pakistani
forces, which surrendered after 2 weeks of war.98
Considering these events, it may well be maintained that the breakaway of
Bangladesh from Pakistan (initially) constituted an example of unilateral secession
that, in view of the severe oppression and gross human rights violations involved,
served a remedial purpose. This is not necessarily to say, however, that it actually
qualifies as a case in which a right to remedial secession was accepted and applied
by the international community. In this respect, it is important to note that the UN
General Assembly subsequently adopted Resolution 2793 (XXVI), which called for
the withdrawal of Indian forces, but did not make any reference to the right to self-
determination or an entitlement to (remedial) secession for the East.99 Moreover, it
should be borne in mind that although the human rights violations in East Pakistan
and the news reports of genocide may have led to international sympathy for the
declaration of independence, it did not lead to widespread recognition of the newly
93 Dugard and Raicˇ (2006), pp. 120–130. See also Ryngaert and Griffioen (2009), paras. 24–27; ICJ,
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Oral Statement of the
Netherlands (Lijnzaad), CR 2009/32, 10 December 2009, para. 10.
94 Tancredi (2006), pp. 187–188.
95 For a more elaborate analysis of these and other cases sometimes mentioned in this regard (i.e. Eritrea
and the successor States of the USSR and SFRY), see Van den Driest (2013), pp. 233–290.
96 For background information on Bangladesh, see Pavkovic´ and Radan (2007), pp. 103–104.
97 For an extensive documentation of the atrocities, see International Commission of Jurists (1972),
pp. 26–41.
98 Crawford (2006), pp. 140–141.
99 UN General Assembly Resolution 2793 (XXVI), UN Doc. A/RES/2793 (XXVI), 7 December 1971.
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proclaimed State. Only after the Indian intervention had ousted the Pakistani forces
and thus created a ‘fait accompli’100 did various States decide to recognize
Bangladesh. It is to be emphasized, however, that Bangladesh only became
universally recognized and admitted to the United Nations after Pakistan had
eventually recognized it in early 1974.101 As such, the resignation and acknowl-
edgement of the situation by the parent State appear to have been decisive for the
international community’s recognition of Bangladesh, rather than the oppression
and human rights violations taking place on the territory. It thus seems that the
international community did not consider a right to remedial secession to exist at
that time.102
3.2.2.2 The Case of Kosovo On 17 February 2008, Serbia’s restive province of
Kosovo issued a unilateral declaration of independence.103 The international
responses to this declaration and the advisory proceedings before the ICJ have
provided a unique opportunity to gain an insight into the contemporary stance of the
international community as to attempts at unilateral secession and, more specif-
ically, the theory of remedial secession. For, Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence combined with the territory’s history of oppression, gross human
rights violations and international administration arguably renders Kosovo an
eligible candidate for a claim to remedial secession. Following the issuing of its
declaration of independence, the case of Kosovo was extensively discussed in the
Security Council and General Assembly.104 The records of the debates demonstrate
that UN Member States generally reflected a strong adherence to the traditional
prerogatives of States, such as State sovereignty and territorial integrity, and/or
emphasized the need for a negotiated solution with a view to regional peace and
stability.105 These lines of reasoning appear to be consistent with the conventional
approach to the right to self-determination as explained above, which prioritizes the
achievement of internal self-determination on the basis of negotiations and
discourages the option of secession as long as the consent of the parent State
remains forthcoming. On a more practical level, this stance would also reduce the
risk that Kosovo could serve as a precedent for other secessionist entities in the
world.106
In contrast to the political discourse sketched above, the context of the legal
proceedings of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion led more States to signify the right to
self-determination and the concept of remedial secession. According to the ICJ,
100 Crawford (2006), p. 393.
101 See UN Security Council Resolution 351 (1974), UN Doc. S/RES/351 (1974), 10 June 1974; UN
General Assembly Resolution 3203 (XXIX), UN Doc. A/RES/3203 (XXIX), 17 September 1974.
102 Van den Driest (2013), p. 278.
103 For the history of Kosovo, see e.g. Judah (2008); Summers (2011), pp. 3–51; Weller (2009b),
pp. 25–40.
104 See in particular UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 and
UN General Assembly, 22nd plenary meeting, UN Doc. A/63/PV.22, 8 October 2008.
105 For a more elaborate analysis of the relevant debates in the Security Council and General Assembly,
see Van den Driest (2013), pp. 234–237.
106 Quane (2011), p. 198.
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however, there was a ‘sharp difference of views’ among States on these matters.107
As such, the ICJ seemed to suggest that in the Kosovo proceedings, no widely
shared opinio juris was reflected on the contemporary scope of the right to self-
determination and the existence of a remedial right to unilateral secession. Indeed,
when examining the submissions of the 43 States—predominantly Western States—
that participated in the written and oral proceedings before the Court, it becomes
apparent that most States rejected the theory of remedial secession for varying
reasons, often involving the lack of evidence for such legal entitlement.108 In
addition to the authors of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, only
eleven States109 expressed support for the existence of a right to remedial secession
under contemporary international law.110 While the precise conditions for the
exercise of such right put forward by these States differed to a certain extent, in
essence, two prerequisites may be singled out. The first is substantive in nature and
requires that the people at issue suffers from a persistent refusal of internal self-
determination by the central authorities of the State. The presence of gross human
rights violations was either viewed as an expression of this denial, or as an
additional requirement. The second prerequisite is procedural in nature and requires
that any viable peaceful options to resolve the situation internally are absent. That is
to say that remedial secession operates as an ultimum remedium.111 In this respect, it
is interesting to refer to the stance of the Russian Federation, which set the threshold
relatively high compared to other States acknowledging a right to remedial
secession. It argued that a right to remedial secession could emerge under certain
conditions
limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the
parent state, threatening the very existence of the people in question.
107 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion
of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, para. 82.
108 For a detailed analysis of the submissions in the advisory proceedings, see Van den Driest (2013),
pp. 261–273.
109 These States were Albania, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Poland, the
Russian Federation, Slovenia, and Switzerland. Some States merely touched upon the acknowledgement
of a right to remedial secession or even accepted it rather implicitly, but most commented on the matter at
length. See e.g., ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Written
Statement of Albania, 14 April 2009, paras. 81–95; Ibid., Written Statement of Estonia, 13 April 2009,
paras. 2.1–2.2; Ibid., Written Statement of Finland, 16 April 2009, paras. 6–12; Ibid., Written Statement
of Germany, 15 April 2009, paras. VI.1–VI.2; Ibid., Written Statement of Ireland, 17 April 2009, paras.
28–34; Ibid., Oral Statement of Jordan (Al Hussein), CR 2009/31, 9 December 2009, paras. 35–38; Ibid.,
Written Statement of the Netherlands, 17 April 2009, paras. 3.6–3.22; Ibid., Oral Statement of the
Netherlands (Lijnzaad), CR 2009/32, 10 December 2009, paras. 9–10; Ibid., Written Statement of Poland,
14 April 2009, paras. 6.1–6.12; Ibid., Written Statement of the Russian Federation, 16 April 2009, paras.
76–103; Ibid., Written Comments of Slovenia, 17 July 2009, para. 8; Ibid., Written Statement of
Switzerland, 25 May 2009, paras. 63–97.
110 See ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Written Statement
of the Russian Federation, 16 April 2009, para. 88.
111 See Van den Driest (2013), pp. 245–261.
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Otherwise, all efforts should be taken in order to settle the tension between the
parent state and the ethnic community concerned within the framework of the
existing state.112
According to the Russian Federation, this threshold was not met in the case of
Kosovo. It considered that Serbia’s offers for enhanced autonomy were rejected by
the Kosovar authorities and found that, in 2008, there was no longer any (threat of)
extreme oppression of the Kosovo Albanian population by Serbia.113 While it has
been contended by some States that the passage of time actually contributes to the
fulfilment of the above-mentioned procedural condition for the exercise of a right to
remedial secession,114 it is indeed questionable whether secession can still be seen
to operate as an ultimum remedium when years have passed since oppression and
gross human rights violations took place, as was the case in Kosovo.
In the proceedings, most of the States supporting the existence of a right to
remedial secession substantiated their claims with reference to the safeguard clauses
of the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, the reports in the A˚land Islands case, and the relevant paragraphs in the
Reference re Secession of Quebec.115 It is striking, though, that virtually no State
claimed that the existence of a right to remedial secession is rooted in practice. Even
where this was asserted, the validity of this claim was hardly underpinned with
reference to specific examples from practice. The Netherlands was one of the few
States to argue that the creation of Bangladesh and Croatia could be seen as relevant
cases in this respect, yet it did so without further explanation.116 From the limited
number of references to practice, it may be deduced that States did not consider
international practice to provide for particularly strong support for a right to
remedial secession under international law, possibly even due to the presumed
absence of State practice that is both relevant and sound in this respect.117 To the
same effect, it is highly questionable whether the case of Kosovo in itself presents
State practice on the issue of remedial secession. As the serious injustices suffered
by the Kosovo Albanians had already been over for 9 years when the declaration of
independence was issued in 2008, it may well be argued that the situation had ‘lost
its emergency character’ and thus cannot be seen as State practice in support of a
112 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Written
Statement of the Russian Federation, 16 April 2009, para. 88. It should be noted that Russia’s
acceptance of a right to remedial secession in general may be understood against the backdrop of
Russia’s support for Georgia’s secessionist regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Moldova’s restive
region of Transnistria.
113 Ibid., paras. 89–103.
114 See e.g. ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Written
Statement of the Netherlands, 17 April 2009, para. 3.15.
115 See Van den Driest (2013), pp. 246–261.
116 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Oral Statement of
the Netherlands (Lijnzaad), CR 2009/32, 10 December 2009, para. 10.
117 Van den Driest (2013), p. 260.
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right to remedial secession.118 Kosovo’s disputed international legal status today
seems to support this line of reasoning as well. So while the case of Kosovo may
reflect some limited opinio juris on the existence of a right to remedial secession
under contemporary international law, it does not present an example of State
practice in this respect either. Taken together with the absence of such practice
beyond the case of Kosovo, it should thus be concluded that a right to remedial
secession cannot be seen to have crystallized as a norm of customary international
law.119
3.3 A Right to External Self-Determination or Remedial Secession
for Crimea?
Having explained the contemporary scope of the right to self-determination and
the (non-)existence of a right to remedial secession under international law, it
becomes relevant to consider the events in Crimea in light of the above. In this
respect, it is important to first note that the Constitution of Ukraine does not
provide for a provision granting Crimea or any other part of the territory a right to
secede. As the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (commonly
known as the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission) pointed out, the
Constitution of Ukraine does not even allow for referendums on secession.120
While it is true that the Constitution does recognize referendums as an expression
of the will of the people, this does not imply that referendums are constitutional
by definition. In fact, various provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine
demonstrate that the secession of part of the territory of Ukraine cannot be the
result of a local referendum. First, Article 2 of the Constitution emphasizes the
importance of the sovereignty of Ukraine and the indivisibility and inviolability of
its present borders.121 With respect to referendums more specifically, the
Constitution subsequently provides that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is
competent to organize and conduct local referendums,122 but as Article 73
stipulates, ‘[i]ssues of altering the territory of Ukraine are resolved exclusively by
an All-Ukrainian referendum’.123 So, since referendums concerning the change of
the Ukrainian territorial status quo can only be decided by a referendum on the
national level, Crimea was not authorized to organize and conduct a local
118 Oeter (2015), p. 64.
119 For a more extensive appraisal of State practice and opinio juris, see Van den Driest (2013),
pp. 290–296.
120 European Commission on Democracy Through Law, Opinion on whether the decision taken by the
Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to organize a referendum on
becoming a constituent territory of the Russian Federation or restoring Crimea’s 1992 constitution is
compatible with constitutional principles, CDL-AD(2014)002-e, Venice, 21–22 March 2014, http://www.
venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2014)002-e, paras. 10–19. Accessed August 2015.
121 Constitution of Ukraine, text provided by the Ukrainian authorities on 13 March 2014, http://www.
venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2014)012-e, Art. 2. Accessed August 2015.
122 Ibid., Art. 138(2).
123 Ibid., Art. 73.
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referendum on its secession from Ukraine. To put it even stronger, for such
secession to be constitutional, a constitutional amendment would be required,
since the Constitution recognizes the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as an
‘inseparable constituent part of Ukraine’.124 As the Venice Commission pointed
out, however, such a constitutional amendment would be prohibited by means of
Article 157 of the Constitution, which determines that no constitutional
amendments shall be made ‘if the amendments foresee the abolition or restriction
of human and citizens’ right and freedoms, or if they are oriented toward the
liquidation of the independence or violation of the territorial indivisibility of
Ukraine’.125 The Constitutional Court of Ukraine confirmed the unconstitutional
character of Crimea’s decision to hold a referendum on its independence in its
decision of 14 March 2014.126 Consequently, Crimea could not claim a right to
secession under Ukrainian constitutional law. The case of Crimea also does not
represent an example of what is often called consensual secession, as the
Ukrainian authorities in Kiev strongly opposed the breaking away of the Crimean
Peninsula and continue to uphold their territorial counterclaim to date.127
The question thus rises whether international law granted (the people of) Crimea
a right to unilateral secession. To this end, it should first be determined whether the
inhabitants of the Crimean Peninsula actually qualify as the holders of the right to
self-determination: a ‘people’. As was explained above, it is generally seen that not
only the population of an existing State as a whole constitutes a ‘people’, but that
distinct groups within the population may also qualify as such. In that respect, the
members of the group share certain objectively identifiable common features—e.g.
ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and/or religious—that distinguish them from other
groups. Moreover, it is essential that the group has a connection with a particular
territory, that it believes to have a distinct group identity and wishes to be
recognized as such. Some of the groups inhabiting the peninsula—in particular the
ethnic–Russians and Crimean Tatars128—may well be considered as ethnic
minorities within Ukraine, thus entitled to minority protection under international
law.129 However, it is debatable whether the population of Crimea as a whole
constitutes a ‘people’ under international law. Although it is clear that the
inhabitants of the Crimean Peninsula share a common territory and constitute a
separate political unit within Ukraine as a result of Crimea’s autonomous status,130
124 Ibid., Art. 134.
125 Ibid., Art. 157.
126 For an English-language summary of the decision, see Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Summary to
the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, No.2-rp/2014, dated March 14, 2014, available at
http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/doccatalog/list?currDir=238920. Accessed August 2015.
127 See e.g. ‘Ukraine PM: Crimea was, is and will be an integral part of Ukraine’, 7 March 2014, http://
edition.cnn.com/2014/03/06/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tensions/. Accessed August 2015.
128 What is more, the Crimean Tatars have a long-standing claim for recognition as the indigenous
people of the Crimean Peninsula.
129 For instance, under Art. 27 ICCPR.
130 On the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within Ukraine, see Constitution of Ukraine,
text provided by the Ukrainian authorities on 13 March 2014, http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/
documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2014)012-e, Chapter X. Accessed August 2015.
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it remains questionable whether they actually have a distinct group identity and the
wish to be identified as such. In fact, it seems that the population of the Crimean
Peninsula is too diverse to meet the threshold of a ‘people’.131 Only when taking a
territorial approach to the right to self-determination and applying it to the territory
of Crimea rather than its inhabitants could the right to self-determination be
invoked.132 Such an interpretation, however, is undesirable since the relevant
treaties and instruments clearly stipulate that the right to self-determination is a right
of ‘peoples’ rather than territories.133
Even when assuming that the right to self-determination does apply to either the
population or the territory of Crimea, no general right to unilateral secession could
be claimed, as the right to self-determination does not encompass such a right in the
post-decolonization era. Alternatively, an alleged right to remedial secession could
be said to provide for a legal basis for secession. As was observed above, during the
debates in the Security Council, the Russian Federation has claimed that the ‘lives
and legitimate interests’ of the Russian(-speaking) population in Crimea were at
stake,134 thereby implicitly relying on a right to remedial secession. Such argument,
however, cannot be upheld on the basis of both legal and factual grounds. The
doctrine of remedial secession is highly controversial and cannot be said to be part
of positive international law, be it customary law or otherwise. Even when taking a
very progressive stance and assuming the existence of a right to remedial secession,
it should be concluded that such right would not apply in the case of Crimea. In both
literature and case law, the right to remedial secession is generally described as an
entitlement that would only emerge under exceptional circumstances. The denial of
meaningful internal self-determination, the existence of gross human rights
violations, and structural discriminatory treatment of the group are frequently
mentioned as prerequisites for such a right. What is more, even proponents of a right
to remedial secession consider this option to be an ultimum remedium, thus
requiring genuine attempts at settling the dispute internally first. It is clear that
Crimea does not meet this high threshold. In this respect, it is relevant to note that
there are no indications that Crimea’s status as an Autonomous Republic within
Ukraine was inadequate for enabling the meaningful exercise of the right to internal
self-determination.135 But even if this was the case, it should be emphasized that
there have been no requests for enhanced autonomy for the Crimean Peninsula. As
such, it cannot be convincingly argued that secession was a remedy of last resort.
Moreover, there have been no reports of gross human rights violations or structural
131 But see Peters (2015), pp. 258–259.
132 For this line of reasoning, see Weller (2009b), p. 17.
133 See Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, para. 123. For a
similar argument, see Vidmar (2011), p. 364.
134 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.7125, 3 March 2015, p. 3 (Mr. Churkin).
135 On Crimea’s autonomous status and the relationship between the various groups inhabiting the
peninsula, see Bowring (2005).
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discriminatory treatment of the Crimean population by the Ukrainian authorities.136
The approval of the draft bill of 23 February 2014, aiming to define the Ukrainian
language as the sole official State language within Ukraine,137 might have fuelled
the fear of discriminatory treatment and oppression of the ethnic-Russian population
of Crimea138 and may even conflict with minority rights standards. However, it
cannot plausibly be said that this circumstance meets the high standard for an
alleged right to remedial secession—let alone that it meets the even more radical
standard that was previously set by the Russian Federation itself. As was observed
above, against the backdrop of the events in Kosovo, the Russian Federation had
acknowledged a right to remedial secession in case of ‘an outright armed attack by
the parent state, threatening the very existence of the people in question’.139 When
applying this to the situation in Crimea, it should be concluded that it does not even
come close to the ‘extreme circumstances’ under which the Russian Federation
accepted a claim for remedial secession. All things considered, it should thus be
concluded that the Crimean authorities could not claim a right to remedial secession,
not even de lege ferenda.
4 The (Il)legality of Crimea’s Unilateral Secession
Having demonstrated that Crimea could not claim a right to external self-
determination or unilateral secession, not even as a remedy of last resort, a pertinent
question is whether its unilateral secession from Ukraine was in fact prohibited or
illegal under contemporary international law. In this context, the principle of
territorial integrity is often invoked as a shield against attempts at unilateral
secession.140 To assess whether—in the absence of a legal entitlement—interna-
tional law actually prohibited Crimea’s attempt at unilateral secession, this section
will first consider whether the principle of territorial integrity can be seen as a ban in
this respect. It will be argued that while the various safeguard clauses referring to
136 Neither have there been indications of violations of the human rights of the ethnic-Russian population
in Crimea. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human
Rights Situation in Ukraine, 15 April 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/ENACARegion/Pages/
UAIndex.aspx. August 2015; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recent developments in
Ukraine: threats to the functioning of democratic institutions, Resolution 1988 (2014), 9 April 2014, para.
15.
137 See Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, ‘On Principles of the State Language Policy’, available at http://
zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/anot/en/5029-17. Accessed August 2015.
138 See also Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recent developments in Ukraine: threats
to the functioning of democratic institutions, Resolution 1988 (2014), 9 April 2014, para. 11.
139 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Written Statement
of the Russian Federation, 16 April 2009, para. 88.
140 See e.g., ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Written
Statement of Argentina, 17 April 2009, paras. 69–80; Ibid., Oral Statement of China (Xue), CR 2009/29,
7 December 2009, para. 25.
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this principle certainly discourage attempts at unilateral secession, they do not
strictly preclude it. Yet, this section will subsequently explain that there are
circumstances under which an attempt at unilateral secession is prohibited
nonetheless, and that this exception applies to the case of Crimea.
4.1 The Principle of Territorial Integrity and Unilateral Secession
As was already noted, the principle of territorial integrity is highly valued by States
and it is often said to be violated by attempts at unilateral secession. It is
questionable, however, whether the principle actually prohibits such unilateral
action under international law. In the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the ICJ notably
concluded that ‘[t]he principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of
relations between States’.141 The Court substantiated its position by referring to
three international instruments containing a clause on the principle of territorial
integrity, i.e. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,142 Principle I, paragraph 1 of the
Friendly Relations Declaration,143 and Article IV of the Helsinki Final Act.144
These paragraphs are all explicitly addressed at States and primarily denote
territorial integrity in the context of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in
inter-State relations. As such, the territorial integrity of one State may only be
violated by another State. Since secession is by definition sought by entities that are
not (yet) States—but aspire to become one—unilateral action aimed at secession
would not impair the principle of territorial integrity.145 In this view, the principle of
territorial integrity generally does not pose a barrier to or even a prohibition on
attempts at (unilateral) secession. Only when a third State would actively support a
secessionist attempt by the threat or use of force, or when the secession would be
carried out by foreign authorities in the sense that they invade a territory with a view
to separating it from the parent State, would these events violate the principle of
territorial integrity.146
Disregarding the applicability of the principle of territorial integrity with
respect to unilateral secession, the view presented by the ICJ seems to be in line
with what is often called the ‘legal neutrality’ of international law on this matter:
141 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion
of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, para. 80.
142 Art. 2(4) reads: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’
143 Principle I, para. 1 stipulates that ‘States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’. See Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), UN
Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), Annex, 24 October 1970.
144 Art. IV declares that ‘[t]he participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the
participating States’. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki, 1 August
1975, 14 ILM 1272 (1975).
145 See also Vidmar (2012a), p. 163.
146 See Crawford (2000), p. 158.
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international law neither authorizes unilateral secession, nor prohibits it. Instead, it
should be regarded as a domestic affair of the parent State, while only the
consequences of such action—e.g. questions of statehood, the obligation for third
States to refrain from supporting the secessionist entity,147 and in some instances
an obligation to withhold recognition148—are regulated by international law.149
While the ICJ’s position on the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is
understandable considering the sources it relied on and is accurate to a certain
extent, it is too restrictive. As I have explained elsewhere in greater detail,150 the
Court overlooked other references that indicate the need for a more inclusive
interpretation of the principle of territorial integrity and show that it does apply to
cases of unilateral secession. In this respect, it is important to note that in addition
to the paragraph in the Friendly Relations Declaration that was mentioned by the
Court, the principle of territorial integrity is elaborated upon in Principle V,
paragraph 7 as well. This safeguard clause, which was already mentioned above in
the context of the doctrine of remedial secession151 but was ignored by the Court,
denotes the principle of territorial integrity against the backdrop of the right to
self-determination. It protects the principle of territorial integrity beyond the threat
or use of force and seems to construe the principle as a limitation to the exercise
of the right to self-determination, which suggests that the principle of territorial
integrity is addressed to the subjects of the right to self-determination, i.e. peoples.
This reading is supported by the fact that the ultimate paragraph of Principle V
explicitly calls upon States to respect territorial integrity in their international
relations.152 Moreover, several other instruments concerning the rights of
indigenous peoples and minorities, such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples153 and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities,154 indicate that non-State entities are also
expected to observe the principle of territorial integrity.155 Phrased differently, the
principle of territorial integrity has an intra-State dimension in addition to the
traditionally and often referred to inter-State dimension. This implies that the
principle of territorial integrity is actually relevant with respect to attempts at
147 See, e.g., Nolte (2006), pp. 76 et seq.
148 See, e.g. Dugard and Raicˇ (2006), pp. 100–101.
149 See, e.g., Crawford (2006), p. 390.
150 See Van den Driest (2015).
151 See Sect. 3.2.2 supra.
152 Vidmar (2011), p. 369.
153 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN General Assembly Resolution 61/295 (2007),
UN Doc. A/RES/47/1 (2007), 7 September 2007, Art. 46(1).
154 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report, 1 February
1995, 34 ILM 351 (1995), Art. 21.
155 For a more elaborate discussion of these instruments and an analysis of practice, see Van den Driest
(2015), pp. 474–478.
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unilateral secession.156 The Russian Federation even seems to have taken this
position one step further in the proceedings of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion,
arguing that the obligation ‘to respect territorial integrity is a legal obligation
stemming from peremptory norms of international law. Those norms are binding
not only upon Member States, but upon all subjects of international law’.157
Relying on its intra-State dimension, some authors have interpreted the principle
of territorial integrity to encompass an outright prohibition of unilateral secession
under international law. Malcolm N. Shaw, for instance, has interpreted Security
Council Resolutions that call upon secessionist entities within a State to respect the
territorial integrity as involving ‘an international legal duty not to secede’.158 In
even stronger terms, Alexander Orakhelashvili, has argued that the application of
the principle of territorial integrity ‘necessarily outlaws secession without the
consent of the parent state’.159 Such an understanding of the principle of territorial
integrity, however, seems to be too far-reaching considering the cautious language
employed by the relevant sources. When reading the Friendly Relations Declara-
tion’s safeguard clause carefully, it is striking that it merely indicates that the
‘dismemberment’ or ‘impairment’ of the territorial integrity of a State is not
‘authorized’ or ‘encouraged’.160 The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples employs similar restrained terminology.161 What is more, the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities specifies that the rights
proclaimed in the Convention should not be understood ‘as implying any right to
[…] act contrary to’ the principle of the territorial integrity of States.162 Hence, the
rights enshrined in the Framework Convention should not be interpreted as
including a right to unilateral secession. This leaves it open to question, however,
whether the exclusion of a right to secede unilaterally necessarily implies that such
action is also illegal or prohibited under international law. As I have argued
156 This intra-State dimension was also acknowledged by Judge Yusuf in his separate opinion attached to
the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. According to Judge Yusuf, the safeguard clause of the Friendly Relations
Declaration ‘primarily protects, and gives priority to, the territorial preservation of States and seeks to
avoid their fragmentation due to separatist forces’. See ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo
(Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Separate
Opinion Judge Yusuf, para. 12 (emphasis added).
157 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Oral Statement of
the Russian Federation, CR 2009/30 (Gevorgian), 8 December 2009, para. 34 (emphasis added). It should
be noted, however, that the peremptory character of the principle of territorial integrity is questionable.
See e.g., Vidmar (2012a), p. 166.
158 Shaw (2014), p. 379 (emphasis in the original).
159 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 13.
160 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution
2625 (XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), Annex, 24 October 1970, Principle V, para. 7.
161 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN General Assembly Resolution 61/295 (2007),
UN Doc. A/RES/47/1 (2007), 7 September 2007, Art. 46(1).
162 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report, 1 February
1995, 34 ILM 351 (1995), Art. 21.
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elsewhere, this cannot be plausibly argued in view of the careful phrasings referred
to above.163 Nonetheless, since international law highly values the territorial
integrity of States and expects States as well as non-State actors to uphold this
fundamental principle, it should be considered to constitute a serious barrier to
attempts at unilateral secession.
4.2 Circumstances Prohibiting Unilateral Secession
Although unilateral secession is not prohibited in general terms—not even by the
principle of territorial integrity—this is not to say that such events are not regulated
by international law at all and that entities with separatist ambitious are thus allowed
to act without any restraints in what some have termed as a ‘Lotus land of
freedom’.164 As was recognized by the ICJ in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion,
practice shows that unilateral declarations of independence are considered to be
illegal acts when stemming from serious violations of fundamental norms of general
international law. With reference to the examples of Southern Rhodesia, Northern
Cyprus, and the Republika Srpska, in which the Security Council had labelled the
respective attempts at new State creation as invalid or unlawful, the Court
concluded that
the illegality attached to the declarations of independence […] stemmed not
from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact
that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force
or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in
particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens).165
Although the Court explicitly pronounced itself on the (il)legality of declarations
of independence rather than attempts at unilateral secession more in general, the
exception phrased does pose legal limitations on attempts at unilateral secession in a
broader sense. In fact, it prohibits (unilateral) secession when the attempt is
connected with flagrant violations of international law, most prominently jus cogens
norms. The example of Northern Cyprus may be particularly illustrative for the
present purposes.166
Following British rule in Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus
reached a set of arrangements concerning the constitutional structures of Cyprus and
the role of Greece and Turkey in guaranteeing these structures. The arrangements
also protected the territorial integrity of Cyprus and prohibited the union of Cyprus
with another State or the secession of part of the territory. However, the
163 See Van den Driest (2015), p. 481. See also Christakis (2011), p. 85; Vidmar (2012b), p. 708.
164 See, for instance, Christakis (2011), p. 83 and Peters (2011), pp. 95–108, referring to the principle
developed in the Lotus case that what is not prohibited, is permitted.
165 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion
of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, para. 81.
166 See also Vidmar (2015), p. 376.
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constitutional framework proved unsustainable.167 Tensions between the Greek and
Turkish communities paralyzed the institutions and by 1963, the Turkish
community in Cyprus lived separately in enclaves and proved practically self-
administering. After the military coup by Greek Cypriots who questioned the
constitutional framework of Cyprus, Turkey sent in military forces in July 1974 and
occupied the northern part of the island in order to support the Turkish Cypriot
population. The UN General Assembly deplored the situation and called for the
withdrawal of foreign armed forces.168 Nonetheless, the unlawful occupation
continued and on 15 December 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) was proclaimed.169 The UN Security Council subsequently adopted
Resolution 541 (1983) in which it ‘deplore[d] the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot
authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus’ and
considered it to be ‘legally invalid’.170 Consequently, the Security Council called
‘upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and
non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus’ and ‘not to recognize any Cypriot State
other than the Republic of Cyprus’.171 To the same effect, Resolution 550 (1984)
condemned ‘all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of ambas-
sadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership’ and declared them to be
‘illegal and invalid’.172 The Security Council subsequently reiterated its ‘call upon
all States not to recognise the purported state of the [TRNC] set up by secessionist
acts’.173 Although not explicitly noted by the Security Council, it was Turkey’s
unlawful occupation of the north of Cyprus that led to the illegality of the TRNC’s
declaration of independence and secessionist actions. In other words, since Turkey
sought to create the TRNC in violation of the prohibition of the threat or use of
force, the issuing of the declaration of independence of 15 December 1983 and
subsequent secessionist acts were considered to be unlawful under international law.
The consequence of this illegal attempt at the creation of a new State was an
obligation erga omnes to withhold recognition.174
167 Crawford (2006), p. 143.
168 UN General Assembly Resolution 3212 (1974), UN Doc. A/RES/3212, 1 November 1974, para. 2.
169 Crawford (2006), p 144.
170 UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), UN Doc. S/RES/541, 18 November 1983, paras. 1–2.
171 Ibid., paras. 6–7. Despite the legally non-binding character of Resolution 541, which was not adopted
under Chapter VII, no State has recognized the TRNC except for Turkey, whose action was condemned
by the Security Council. See UN Security Council Resolution 550 (1984), UN Doc. S/RES/550 (1984), 11
May 1984, para. 2.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., para. 3.
174 This obligation emerged as a political obligation in the Stimson doctrine. Today, the obligation of
non-recognition arises under customary international law and is enshrined in Art. 41(2) of the Articles on
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. See International Law Commission (ILC),
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, 2001
Yearbook ILC, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 26, Commentary to Art. 41. See also Crawford (2006), pp. 158–162.
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4.3 The (il)legality of Crimea’s Secession from Ukraine
Having explained the relevant legal rules for determining the lawfulness of attempts
at unilateral secession, the implications for the case of Crimea now merit
consideration. In view of the above, it is clear that while the people of Crimea were
to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the principle of territorial integrity did
not prohibit them from seceding.175 As such, Crimea’s attempted secession from
Ukraine did not violate international law. However, the specific circumstances
surrounding Crimea’s attempted separation from Ukraine do raise some serious
issues. Most prominently, the question presents itself whether the presence of the
Russian military on the Crimean Peninsula qualifies as ‘the unlawful use of force or
other egregious violations of norms of international law, in particular those of a
peremptory character’,176 which would render the declaration of independence an
illegal act and consequently preclude the attempted secession.
It is important to note in this respect that the presence of Russian troops in
Crimea was lawful to the extent that it remained within the scope of the 1997 Black
Sea Fleet Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. This treaty,
which was extended until 2017 in 2010, gives the Russian Federation the authority,
inter alia, to deploy troops on the Crimean Peninsula.177 While a maximum of
25,000 soldiers was allowed under the Agreement, they were only authorized to stay
on the military bases and to move between these bases and the territory of the
Russian Federation. The treaty also stipulated that those troops are to respect
Ukrainian law and sovereignty, and do not interfere in the internal affairs of
Ukraine. Moreover, the treaty only covered troops that are part of or attached to the
Black Sea Fleet. As it was reported that Russian troops were operating outside their
agreed bases, seizing Crimean airports and military bases and occupying key
buildings including the Crimean Supreme Council,178 it appears that the Russian
military presence was by no means justified by the 1997 Black Sea Fleet
Agreement. As such, their invasion and active (armed) support of Crimea’s attempt
at unilateral secession violated the principle of non-intervention and the territorial
integrity of Ukraine.179 In addition, the events in Crimea can be qualified prima
175 This is not to say, however, that the principle of territorial integrity was not violated by the Russian
Federation. See Van den Driest (2015).
176 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion
of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, para. 81.
177 Agreement Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Status and Conditions of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet’s Stay on Ukrainian Territory, 28 May 1997, English translation in: Black (1998), p. 129.
Following the incorporation of Crimea, the treaty was unilaterally terminated by the Russian Federation
under Arts. 61 and 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Kremlin, Termination of
Agreements on the Presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine, 2 April 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/20673. Accessed August 2015.
178 See Sect. 2 supra.
179 In this respect, it may be noted that the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership
between Ukraine and the Russian Federation also guaranteed respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and
the inviolability of its borders. See Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine
and the Russian Federation, 31 May 1997, reprinted in Black (1998), p. 217.
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facie as the threat—and possibly also the use—of force as prohibited by Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter.180 In line with the argument by the Ukrainian Association of
International Law,181 some have even contended that the Russian Federation
committed an act of aggression as defined in General Assembly Resolution 3314
(XXIX).182 Notwithstanding the precise qualification of the Russian military
intervention in Crimea—as the breach of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the threat of
force, the use of force, or an act of aggression—it seems safe to contend that it
involved an egregious violation of a norm of general international law, possibly
even of a peremptory character.183 Since the unlawful acts by the Russian
Federation have clearly facilitated the issuing of Crimea’s unilateral declaration of
independence,184 this constituted an illegal act in the terms of the Kosovo Advisory
Opinion, as a consequence of which Crimea’s attempt at unilateral secession was
prohibited under international law.185
5 Conclusions
This article aimed to assess Crimea’s separation from Ukraine against the backdrop
of the international legal framework concerning the right to self-determination and
secession. To this end, it was first examined whether the right to self-determination
or an alleged right to remedial secession could serve as a legal basis for the
separation of the Crimean Peninsula, as the Crimean authorities and the Russian
Federation seem to have argued. It was explained, however, that beyond the context
of decolonization, the right to self-determination does not encompass a general right
180 See e.g., Bı´lkova´ (2015), p. 32; Christakis (2014), pp. 750 et seq.
181 For an English translation of the appeal by the Ukrainian Association of International Law, see
Akande (2014).
182 See e.g., Sari (2014); Tancredi (2014). For an analysis of possible (progressive) justifications for the
Russian intervention in Crimea, such as intervention by invitation, the protection of nationals abroad and
humanitarian intervention, see Bı´lkova´ (2015), p. 49; Christakis (2014), pp. 750 et seq.; Walter (2014),
pp. 307–309.
183 This qualification certainly applies when adhering to the argument presented by the Russian
Federation in the context of the case of Kosovo, where it contended that the principle of territorial
integrity is a peremptory norm. See ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration
of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory
Opinion), Oral Statement of the Russian Federation, CR 2009/30 (Gevorgian), 8 December 2009, para.
34.
184 See also Marxsen (2014); Vidmar (2015), pp. 375–376.
185 It deserves to be noted that the illegality surrounding Crimea’s attempt to secede has not remained
without legal consequences. Sanctions have been imposed on the Russian Federation and the illegality of
Crimea’s unilateral declaration of independence has triggered a customary legal obligation for all States
not to recognize the new factual situation. This obligation was first articulated in a draft resolution by the
Security Council, which was not adopted due to a negative vote by the Russian Federation (see UN
Security Council, UN Doc. S/2014/189, 15 March 2014, para. 5). In similar wording, General Assembly
Resolution 68/262 subsequently reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Ukraine and called ‘upon all States,
international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea […] and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted
as recognizing such altered status’ (see UN General Assembly, Resolution 68/262, UN Doc. A/RES/68/
262, 27 March 2014, para. 6; vote record: 100 votes in favour, 11 votes against, 58 abstentions).
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to unilateral secession. Instead, this right is expected to be implemented internally,
within the framework of the existing State. Subsequently, the article demonstrated
that contemporary international law does not acknowledge a right to remedial
secession, as is often argued in literature. It is not only questionable whether such
right could actually be based on an a contrario reading of the safeguard clauses, but
also, practice does not provide for strong evidence in this respect. Judicial and semi-
judicial bodies have generally used very cautious language as regards the existence
of a right to remedial secession, their pronouncements on the matter have remained
limited to an obiter dictum and in no case has a right to unilateral secession actually
been granted as a remedy to the injustices that occurred in the case at issue. The
article also demonstrated that on the basis of the practice of and views presented by
States, it cannot be concluded that a right to remedial secession has crystallized as a
customary norm. While the case of Kosovo may be seen to reflect some limited
opinio juris on the existence of such a right, State practice is virtually absent.
With respect to the case of Crimea, it was argued that while some of the groups
inhabiting the peninsula may well be considered as ethnic minorities entitled to
minority protection under international law, it remains questionable whether the
population of Crimea as a whole constitutes a ‘people’ as holders of the right to
(internal) self-determination in the first place. Moreover, even when taking a very
progressive stance and assuming that a right to remedial secession does exist, the
case of Crimea does not meet the high threshold in this respect. There are no
indications that the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination of
the Crimean population was denied and there have been no reports of gross human
rights violations or structural discriminatory treatment by the Ukrainian authorities.
As a consequence, the Crimean authorities could not claim a right to remedial
secession.
In the absence of a legal entitlement, the article subsequently turned to the
question whether Crimea’s unilateral secession was prohibited under international
law. It was first argued that the principle of territorial integrity should be seen to
have an intra-State dimension in addition to the often referred to inter-State
dimension and, as such, is relevant to attempts at unilateral secession. But while the
principle of territorial integrity strongly discourages such attempts, the cautious
phrasings of, for instance, the Friendly Relations Declaration, the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities indicate that it does not actually prohibit them.
Nevertheless, there are situations in which an attempt at unilateral secession is
considered to be illegal in view of the circumstances. In the Kosovo Advisory
Opinion, the ICJ concluded that declarations of independence are illegal when
‘connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of
general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus
cogens)’. While the Court pronounced itself on declarations of independence rather
than attempts at unilateral secession more in general, it was contended that it does
pose legal limitations in this respect. It is precisely this exception that is relevant in
the case of Crimea: its attempted unilateral secession was illegal due to it being the
outcome of the unlawful Russian military intervention on the peninsula, which
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qualifies as an egregious violation of a norm of general international law, possibly
even of a jus cogens character.
All in all, it should be concluded that the arguments involving an alleged right to
self-determination and (remedial) secession as advanced by the Crimean and
Russian authorities in attempting to justify the events on the Crimean Peninsula
cannot be upheld. On the contrary: Crimea’s unilateral secession from Ukraine
clearly was illegal under international law.
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